Quantum key distribution is one of the most fundamental cryptographic protocols. Quantum walks are important primitives for computing. In this paper we take advantage of the properties of quantum walks to design new secure quantum key distribution schemes. In particular, we introduce a secure quantum key-distribution protocol equipped with verification procedures against full man-in-the-middle attacks. Furthermore, we present a one-way protocol and prove its security. Finally, we propose a semi-quantum variation and prove its robustness against eavesdropping.
Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is the most secure and practical instance of quantum cryptography. We recall that a key distribution scheme is a protocol between two parties with the purpose of sharing a common string (the key), which afterwards, they can use to communicate privately, in a pre-agreed encryption scheme. Therefore, it is required that any third party that might be eavesdropping is not able to extract information about the key, and thus compromizing the privacy of the communication. Bennet and Brassard [1] in 1984, and Ekert [2] in 1991, proposed the first QKD protocols, upon which all QKD protocols are based. Since then a lot of modifications and improvements have been proposed in order to achieve unconditionally secure and practical QKD schemes, by taking advantage of the physical laws of quantum mechanics. For a review, see [3] . Several QKD experiments over long distances have been reported [4, 5, 6, 7] , and QKD is already commercial 1 . Furthermore, the recent successful launch of a satellite [8] paved the way for intercontinental QKD.
Quantum walks (QW) have been introduced in 1993, in [9] , as the quantum analogue of classical random walks. Since then, they have been playing a major role in quantum computing theory, as their applications vary from quantum algorithms [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] to universal quantum computing schemes [15, 16, 17] .
Recently, the application of QWs to the creation of actual quantum cryptographic protocols has been investigated. For instance, in [18] , Rohde et al., proposed a limited form of quantum homomorphic encryption using multi-particle QWs. In their protocol, a server could manipulate data sent by a client in such a way that, first, the server has limited information on the client's data while, second, the client has limited information on the server's computation.
In this paper, we revisit the public-key cryptosystem [19] , which is based on QWs, in order to construct secure QKD protocols. First, we suitably modify [19] , so that the quantum state generated by means of a QW encodes the secret key as opposed to the message; such a key could be used later as input to a one-time-pad encryption system gaining information theoretic security for message delivery. Our motivation is that QKD schemes have several advantages, which we present in due course, over public-key cryptosystems. The modification of the original public-key system is non-trivial, however, and requires care as we can no longer rely on the existence of a trusted mechanism for public-key delivery (such as a public-key infrastructure), as is typically assumed in quantum public-key cryptography [20, 21, 19] .
While the above QKD protocol is two-way, i.e., both Alice and Bob perform QW operations, we also construct a one-way QKD protocol, where again the key is encoded in a QW state. In this case, it is only A that chooses randomly the precise QW to encode the key, while B is randomly choosing in which basis (computational or QW) to measure in order to obtain it. After disclosing their choices by means of classical communication, they are able to establish a shared key. We prove that the protocol is secure against general attacks, even if the eavesdropper Eve (E) has great advantage over A and B.
As a third contribution in this paper, we propose a new semi-quantum key-distribution (SQKD) protocol based on QWs. Semi-quantum cryptography was first introduced in 2007 by Boyer et al., in [22, 23] as a way to study "how quantum" does a protocol need to be in order to gain an advantage over its classical counterpart -namely, how quantum do the parties need to be in order to establish a secret key secure against an all powerful adversary. Using classical communication alone, this task is impossible -indeed, any key distribution protocol, relying only on classical communication, cannot be unconditionally secure and, instead, requires computational hardness assumptions to be made on the adversary. On the other hand, QKD protocols do have provable unconditional security. A semi-quantum protocol places severe restrictions on one of the participating users (typically B) in that he may only operate in a "classical" or "semi-quantum" manner. Namely, this limited user can only directly work with the computational Z basis. No restrictions are placed on the other participant A, and of course, no restrictions are placed on E.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a brief introduction to QWs, with all the information and notation used throughout the paper. In Section 3, we present a secure two way QKD scheme based on QWs, which is a modification of the public-key cryptosystem in Ref. [19] . We give motivation for this modification and furthermore, we propose two different verification procedures against full man-in-the-middle attacks. In Section 4, we introduce a one-way QKD protocol, which we prove to be unconditionally secure, by reducing it to an equivalent entanglement-based protocol. We provide our numerical results for the optimal choice of the QW parameters that maximize the noise tolerance of the protocol. Finally, in Section 5 we provide a SQKD protocol and we show its robustness against eavesdropping.
Quantum Walk Preliminaries
In this paper we consider QWs on a circle. In this case, the walker hops along discrete positions on a circle. The Hilbert space H, describing the QW, is the tensor product of the positions Hilbert space H p and the coin Hilbert space H c , i.e. H = H p ⊗ H c . The positions Hilbert space is spanned by the points on a circle {|x |x ∈ {0, · · · , P − 1}}, while H c is spanned by the two possible coin states {|R , |L }, corresponding to heads and tails. The evolution for one step of the QW is given by the unitary operator
where I p is the identity operator in H p , R c ∈ SU (2) is a rotation in H c , which in matrix form we can write it as:
and
is the shift operator that moves the walker one position to the right or to the left on the circle, depending on its coin state. Notice that, since we are on a circle, the P -th position is identified with the 0 position.
Quantum Walk Key-Distribution Scheme
In this section we introduce a QKD scheme based on QWs. In this context, the key for the QKD is encrypted as the message in the public-key cryptosystem introduced in [19] . This modification is motivated by the fact that QKD schemes are more flexible than public-key protocols, as the key can be used by both A and B to send or authenticate messages. Also, more post-processing techniques (e. g. privacy amplification) can be applied, since we have as input a random string and not a plaintext message. In the latter case we should be careful during the post-processing not to degrade the message (we are left with less techniques). Furthermore, in the case of information leakage, we can safely abort the protocol, while during message transmission it would be late for that. Our QW-QKD scheme is depicted in Fig. 1 and presented below. We assume that the key can be chosen among P possible keys. We also assume that the QW can be chosen from a prefixed discrete set known by both parties. 
Protocol 1. Quantum key-distribution scheme
Inputs for the protocol
r ∈ {0, . . . , P − 1}, i.e., a key of at most log P bits, chosen by B uniformly at random;
• Quantum state generation:
The QW operator U k with k ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . , K}, the number of steps t ∈ T = {T 0 , . . . , T max } ⊂ N, and the initial state |l ⊗ |s , where l ∈ {0, . . . , P − 1}, s ∈ {R, L}.
In the above, U k , the QW operator is defined as
, where S is the shift operator and R c (θ k ) is a rotation of θ k = k · 2π/K in the coin space, see Eq. 1 and 2.
Quantum state generation
• A chooses uniformly at random l ∈ {0, . . . , P − 1} and s ∈ {R, L}, and generates the initial state |l |s .
• Then she chooses, also at random, the QW U k = S · I p ⊗ R c (θ k ) and the number of steps t ∈ T .
• Finally, she generates the quantum state:
and sends it to B.
Key Encryption
• Upon obtaining the quantum state |ψ from A, B encrypts the key r by applying spatial translation T r = P −1 i=0 |i + r (mod P ) i| to obtain:
where I c is the identity operator in the coin space.
• B sends |ψ(r) to A.
Key Decryption
• A applies U −t k to the state |ψ(r) .
• She performs the position measurement
and obtains the result i 0 . The key sent by B is r = i 0 − l (mod P ).
It is clear, from the design of the protocol and the proof of correctness of the original quantum encryption scheme presented in [19] that, if no one interferes with the quantum states, then the protocol is correct and at the end, A and B will share a common string of length log P , that they can use as a key. In the next section we prove the security of the protocol.
Security of the Scheme
In [19] , it has been shown that E can extract, only with negligible probability, information about the key by means of the quantum states |ψ and |ψ(r) that A and B exchange. Here, we do not present this proof for the sake of briefness, but the interested reader can find it in [19] with all the details.
Another type of attack that E can perform is a full man-in-the-middle attack, in which she impersonates A to B and vice versa, while they think that they are communicating directly. This attack gives E the chance to intercept and alter the communication between them. In public-key cryptosystems such attacks can be prevented by using a public-key infrastructure, which is assumed to work as a trusted third party. In our QKD modification though, such an assumption could not be used, therefore we should complete the security analysis of the scheme, by taking into account full man-in-the-middle attacks. To this end, we propose two different verification procedures, that allow A and B to verify that what they receive is actually coming from each other and not from an eavesdropper pretending to be either of them. We should note that for both verification methods, A and B need to share a classical public authenticated channel (a common requirement in QKD protocols, such as the well-known BB84 scheme [1] ).
Standard Verification
The first technique we propose is a standard cut-and-choose verification, which is achieved by adding redundancy to our scheme. Clearly, the verification is needed twice in our protocol: once when A sends the QW state to B and once when B sends the encoded key to A.
Verification 1: B verifies that it was A who sent him the quantum state. It is needed to prevent E from sending her choice of quantum states to B, which would allow her to read the encrypted key while he is sending it back to A.
• A sends to B m i=1 |ψ i , that is, several quantum states |ψ i , generated by a QW as described in the previous section. Each |ψ i is generated using independently chosen walk parameters and initial states (k i , t i , l i , s i ).
• After B receiving m i=1 |ψ i , A, through a classical authenticated channel, sends him a string v = v 1 v 2 . . . v m of m bits, such that v i = 1 if the corresponding |ψ i is going to be used for verification and v i = 0 otherwise, that is, if the corresponding |ψ i will be used by B to encode part of the key. Through the classical channel, she also sends (j, k j , t j , l j , s j ), for some uniformly at random chosen j's that belong in the set {1, . . . , m}. Let the number of these j's be m/3.
• B verifies that for all these j's, the received states ρ j = |ψ j ψ j | are indeed equal to the pure states
In order to verify that, he applies U −t j k j to the states |ψ j , for all j and then performs a measurement for each j in the positions space as well as in the spin space. This measurement (for each j) is described by the operator:
This way, he traces out all these |ψ j 's and he is left with 2m/3 quantum states. We call the reader's attention to the fact that if the verification fails for any j, the protocol is stopped.
Verification 2: A verifies that it was B who sent her the encrypted key.
This procedure is needed to prevent E from sending to A a message that would decrypt a key different from the one sent by B. In this case, A and B would not be able to communicate, while E would be able to decrypt messages sent by A (not vice versa). To prevent this from happening, A and B repeat the verification procedure 1, with the roles switched. In particular, the two are performing the following steps:
• B encrypts r i ∈ {0, . . . , P − 1} in each of the states of the remaining product state 2m/3 i=1 |ψ i as follows:
that is, translating each state |ψ i by r i in the positions space, leaving the spin part of the state unaltered.
• He sends the product state
• Then he chooses m/3 uniformly at random j 's out of the 2m/3 unused indices from the previous verification procedure. Through the classical public authenticated channel he sends a classical string v = v 1 v 2 . . . v 2m/3 of 2m/3 bits, such that v i = 1 if the corresponding |ψ(r i ) is going to be used for verification and v i = 0 otherwise, that is, if the corresponding |ψ(r i ) contains part of the key. For each j chosen (for which v i = 1), he also sends through the classical public authenticated channel the index and the respective r j 's used to generate the state |ψ(r i ) .
• In the last step, A applies U
on the 2m/3 states |ψ(r i ) and then, for each i, she performs a measurement on the positions space. Let the outcomes be denoted by α i , i ∈ {1, . . . , 2m/3}. For all the indices she computes r i = α i − l i , where l i are the initial positions on the circle that she used for the generation of the quantum states |ψ i . Finally, for each j , r j sent by B, A verifies the consistency of their results.
• The key is given by the concatenation of the bits r i that were not used during the two verification procedures and it has m · (log P )/3 bits. Usually, the choice of m is dependent on the desired length, log P , of the key, and in order to make the success probability of a man-in-the-middle attack negligible on log P , it is common to use m = (log P )/3.
Verification using maximally entangled states
In this section, we present an alternative verification procedure, which prevents E from trying to infer the key by first entangling her ancillas with the systems sent by A, and then performing an additional operation (say, a measurement) on the joint system of her ancillas and those carrying the encrypted key sent back to A by B; a method which in general would give her access to some non-negligible amount of information, so that A and B are not able to securely communicate. Note that this verification procedure could also be used against the previous attack in which E simply impersonates A to B, and vice versa. During the first step of the protocol ("Quantum state generation"), in addition to generating quantum walk states
used to encode the key, for the verification purposes A also creates a number of Bell-like maximally entangled states
between the ancilla systems (denoted by a) and the quantum walk systems (denoted by qw), each of dimension 2P (the dimension of the actual quantum walk). At the end of the first step, A sends to B a random sequence of quantum walk states, each either in the form |ψ qw , or ρ qw = Tr a |ψ ψ| qw , while keeping the ancillas with her. A also sends through a classical public authenticated channel a classical string v = v 1 . . . v n , where v i = 0 if the i-th system is going to be used for the encoding of the key, while v i = 1 if the i-th system is going to be used for verification. The proportion of states used to obtain the key and used for the verification can be chosen in a similar way as in the previous case. Usually, the dimension of the total Hilbert space 2P is of the form 2 n which, in turn, is isomorphic to the Hilbert space resulting from the tensor product of n 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and thus this state can be written as the tensor product of n standard two-qubit |φ + Bell states. After B receives the systems, he and A perform Bell-like measurements on the states meant for the verification and they observe a maximal violation of the Bell's inequalities, since those states are maximally entangled. This way, these states are traced out and B is left with the states (3) in which he will encode the key (as previously).
The same procedure is repeated again, when B sends the encoded key to A. He will send a sequence of states, some of the form (T r ⊗Î c )U t k |l |s , in which part of the key is encoded and some of the form (4) (with his ancillary system |i B maximally entangled to the system sent to A), which are going to be used for the verification, as explained above. In the end of the key decryption phase and if all the verifications were okay, A will concatenate the parts of the key to obtain the full key.
Efficiency and quantum memory requirements
In [19] it has been proven that the protocol is efficient, i.e., it requires only polynomial time (on the length of the message, say n) to transfer n bits of information encoded in n + 1 qubits. By introducing the verification steps in this QKD scheme we increase the complexity of the system to n 2 , in order to make the probability of eavesdropping negligible. However, we should notice that, out of this scheme, the size of the key that A and B share at the end is also increased to n 2 /3, considering m = n. Therefore, the number of bits in the key is linear in the number of qubits sent to B. As a conclusion, our QKD scheme is efficient, since the complexity increased, but only polynomially.
As already mentioned in the Introduction, the lack of stable quantum memories is a major issue in quantum cryptography, since it is a practical constraint that is not likely to be solved, at least in the near future. Short-term quantum memories already exist, however it is not always straightforward to argue about the security of a protocol, relying on their existence. In our case, though, things are quite clear. If E does not interfere, A and B do not need quantum memories to execute the protocol, thus the key distribution is independent of such practical constraints. However, the presence of Eve and the need of verification for A and B introduce memory requirements for all the parties.
Below, we present the memory requirements for the case of Section 3.1.1, noting that the case of Section 3.1.2 is analogous. To conduct her attack, E needs a stable quantum memory, in order to keep the states she intercepted by A, while waiting for B to encrypt and send the key. Subsequently, she will encode it in A's states and send it to her. Also, in this scenario, A and B need a quantum memory, in order to perform the verification. They need to save the quantum states for some time, while waiting for the other party to send the classical information. Observe that E's memory should be more stable than A's and B's, as the time E needs to save the quantum states for, is clearly longer than the time that A and B need for the same purpose.
Hence, we conclude that our QKD scheme is secure, as long as A and B have at least as powerful equipment as the adversary E. Obviously, if the adversary is technologically more advanced, then virtually any real-life implementation of a security protocol becomes potentially vulnerable.
One-way quantum walk key-distribution protocol
In this section we present a one-way QKD protocol based on QWs and we prove that it is secure. First, we state it in its prepare-and-measure form. The protocol procedure is depicted in Figure 2 . Protocol 2. Let θ k , t, and P be publicly known where P is the dimension of the position space of the QW, t is the number of steps to perform the QW, and θ k the coin parameter (see Equation (1)). Let U k be the QW operator U k = S · (I p ⊗ R c (θ k )) that is also known by the parties (i.e., it is also publicly known) and let F be an operator acting only on H c . F 's action is to "flip" the coin to some initial state before evolving the walk and is optional (in which case
We call the orthonormal basis {|ψ i } the QW basis and denote the computational basis by Z.
The Protocol consists of N iterations of the following procedure:
1. A picks a random bit w A ∈ {0, 1} and a value i A ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 2P − 1}.
• If w A = 0: A will prepare and send to B the 2P -dimensional state |ψ i = |i A .
• If w A = 1: A will prepare and send to B the 2P -dimensional state
2. B picks a random bit w B ∈ {0, 1}.
• If w B = 0: B measures the received 2P dimensional state in the computational Z basis resulting in outcome j B .
• If w B = 1: B measures in the QW basis (alternatively, he inverts the QW by applying (U t k ) −1 and measures the resulting state in the Z basis). The result is translated, in the obvious way, into an integer j B .
Note that he measures both the position and coin, as opposite to the previous protocol, where the measurement for the key was only on the positions space. If w A = w B , they will use their values i A and j B to contribute towards their raw key. Otherwise, if w A = w B , they will discard this iteration.
After the above process, A and B will use a cut-and-choose technique similar to Yao's [24] , to check eavesdropping by choosing a suitable subset of non-discarded iterations for parameter estimation in the usual manner (discarding those chosen iterations from the raw key). This allows them to estimate the disturbance Q Z and Q W in the Z and QW bases respectively (i.e., in the absence of noise Q Z = Q W = 0). If this disturbance is "sufficiently low" (to be discussed below) the users proceed with error correction and privacy amplification in the usual manner.
Security
In order to prove the security of Protocol 2, we will construct, in the usual way, an equivalent entanglement-based protocol [25, 26] . Proving security of this entanglement-based protocol will show the security of the prepare-and-measure version. For this entanglement-based version, we make changes to steps (1) and (2), replacing them as follows for each of the N iterations:
New
Step (1): A prepares the entangled state:
|i, i AB which lives in the 4P 2 dimensional Hilbert space: (H p ⊗ H c ) ⊗2 . She sends the second half (the B portion of |φ 0 ) to B while keeping the first half (the A portion) in her private lab.
Step (2): A and B choose independently two random bits w A and w B . If w A = 0, A will measure her half of the entangled state in the computational Z basis; otherwise she will measure her half in the QW basis. Similarly for B and w B . Let their measurement results in values be i A on A's side and j B on B's side.
We now show the security of this entanglement-based version of the protocol. In the following proof, we will initially make three assumptions:
A1: A and B only use those iterations where w A = w B = 0 for their raw key.
A2: E is restricted to collective attacks (those whereby she attacks each iteration of the protocol independently and identically, but is free to perform a joint measurement of her ancilla at any future time of her choosing).
A3: E is the party that actually prepares the states which A and B hold.
Assumption A1 is made only to simplify the computation and may be discarded later (alternatively, one may bias the basis choice so that w A and w B are chosen to be 0 with high probability, thus increasing the efficiency of the protocol as is done for instance for BB84 in [27] ). Assumption A2 may be removed later using a de Finetti-type argument [28, 29, 30] (in this paper, we are only concerned with the asymptotic scenario, so the key-rate expression we derive will not be degraded). Note that removing A2 gives us the security. Assumption A3 gives greater advantage to the adversary; if we prove security using A3, then the "realworld" case, where assumption A3 is not used, will certainly be just as secure, if not even more.
In light of A2 and A3, A, B, and E, after N iterations of the protocol, hold a quantum state ρ ⊗N ABE , where ρ ABE ∈ H A ⊗ H B ⊗ H E with H A ≡ H B ≡ H p ⊗ H c . Following error correction and privacy amplification, A and B will hold a secret key of size (N ). Under the assumption of collective attacks (A2), we may use the Devetak-Winter key-rate expression [31] to compute:
Let A Z and A W be the random variables describing A's system, when she measures in the Z or QW basis, respectively. Similarly, define B Z and B W . Under assumption A1, we are actually interested in the value:
Computing H(A Z |B Z ) is trivial, given the observable probabilities:
The challenge is to determine a bound on the von Neumann entropy S(A Z |E).
To do so, we will use an uncertainty relation, proven in [32] , which states that for any density operator σ ABE acting on Hilbert space H A ⊗H B ⊗H E , if A and B make measurements using
where c = max
where we take ||·|| ∞ to be the operator norm and A i to be the random variable describing A's system after measuring M i (we will later, similarly, define B i ). Assuming measurements M 0 are used for key distillation, simple algebra, as discussed in [32] , yields the Devetak-Winter key-rate:
The last inequality follows from the basic fact that measurements can only increase entropy.
In our case, we have M (0) x = |x x| and M
(1)
i=0 α x,i |i ; then it is easy to see that for all x, y
and therefore c = max
a quantity which depends exclusively on the choice of the QW parameters and not on the noise in the channel. Therefore, A and B should choose optimal t, θ k and P in order to minimize c (thereby maximizing the key-rate equation).
As we show in the next section, this analysis is sufficient to derive good key-rate bounds.
Evaluation
As mentioned above, the value of c depends solely on the QW parameters which are under A and B's control; therefore it is to their advantage to choose a QW which minimizes this value (i.e., such that, after evolving for t steps, the probability of finding the walker at any particular position is small). It is easy to see that, as t → ∞, the values |α x,y | do not converge to a steady state which is why, usually, one considers the time-averaged distribution when analyzing QWs on the cycle [33, 34] . However, in our QKD protocol, we do not care what happens at large t; instead, we wish to find an optimal t and one that is preferably not "too large" (the larger it is, the longer, in general, it might take A to prepare the state and B to reverse it). We begin by looking at various walk parameters and finding the minimal value of c when F = I c , the identity operator. Note that, on the circle, it makes sense only to consider odd P as even P would force the support of the probability amplitudes onto even or odd numbered nodes only thereby increasing the overall value of |α x,y |. We wrote a computer program to simulate the walk for time steps t = 1, 2, · · · , T max (for user-specified value T max ) searching for the optimal value of t (i.e., a value for t whereby c is minimum). For the evaluation we used a more general form of the coin rotation operator:
The results for θ = π/4, φ = 0, and for various P are shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 : Showing minimal value of c found by our program for given position space dimension P when θ = π/4, φ = 0 and F = I c . When P ≤ 13 we set T max = 5000; when P ≥ 79 we set T max = 50000. Note that, the smaller c is, the better for A and B. Note also that P is the dimension of the position space, not the number of qubits sent which would actually be log P + 1 (where the extra "+1" is due to the coin).
Now that we can find the optimal choice of QW parameters for particular values of P and, more importantly for our work here, the resulting value of c. To this end, we have to compute our bound r and determine for what noise levels we can have r > 0. In practice, one would observe values p For the purpose of illustration in this paper, however, we will evaluate our key-rate bound assuming a generalized Pauli channel as discussed in [35] (see, in particular, Section 7 of that source). This channel maps an input state ρ to an output state E(ρ) defined as:
where:
That is, this channel E(·) models an adversary's attack which induces phase and flip errors with probabilities denoted by p m,n . In our numerical computations to follow, we will use:
It is clear that i,j p i,j = 1. Furthermore, when E r = 0, we have i p
, there is no disturbance in the channel) while as E r increases, the disturbance also increases.
Finally, we define the total noise in the channel to be:
That is to say, Q represents the quantum error rate (QER) of the channel.
The maximally tolerated QER, for those QWs analyzed in Figure 3 , and using the above described noise model, is shown in Figure 4 . Note that, when P = 1 and t = 1, we recover the BB84 limit of 11% which is to be expected since, with these choice of parameters, we are essentially running the BB84 protocol. Figure 4 : Showing the maximally tolerated noise level for our protocol using parameters found in Figure 3 and using the quantum channel described by Equations (9) and (11) . The lack of increase in noise tolerance from P = 9 to P = 11 (while other choices caused an increase) indicates that T max was too low. Note that, when P = 1, we recover the BB84 tolerance of Q = 0.11 as expected. Also note that, when P = 229, the maximal tolerated noise is Q = 0.261. Figure 4 that there is a lack of increase when P = 9 and P = 11; this indicates that our choice of T max = 5000 was too low. Running our simulator again with T max = 50000 for these small P values yields a maximally tolerated noise level shown in Figure 5 . Figure 5 : Comparing the maximally tolerated noise when t is allowed to be as large as 50000 (light gray) or only 5000 (dark gray); again when F = I and φ = 0. In this case, when P = 13 and T max = 50000, the maximal tolerated noise Q is Q = 0.241.
Observe in
Finally, we re-run the simulator, using T max = 5000 and T max = 50000 for a different QW parameter of θ = √ 2π/4 which, for these particular upper-bounds on t yield a higher tolerated noise as shown in Figures 6 and 7 . We comment that, if T max were larger, the two QWs may produce a QKD protocol with the same tolerated noise; however for these "smaller" bounds on t the QW with parameter θ = √ 2π/4 produces a more secure protocol than when θ = π/4. Since smaller t implies a more efficient protocol, this is an advantage. This opens two very interesting questions: first, do these QWs produce equivalent noise tolerances as T max → ∞? Second, what other values of θ produce even more secure QKD protocols for small T max ? We comment that we also ran this numerical experiment for θ = π/5 and θ = π/3 but got worse noise tolerances. Figure 6 : Comparing the maximal tolerated noise levels of the QKD protocol when θ = π/4 (dark gray) and θ = √ 2π/4 (light gray). In this chart, T max = 5000 which, observing the "drop" in tolerated noise when P goes from 11 to 13, is too small. See also Figure 7 for the same chart when T max = 50000. . In this chart, T max = 50000. In all cases, the QW parameter θ = √ 2π/4 produces a more secure QKD protocol for this upper-bound on t. Note that, as T max → ∞, they may produce equally secure protocols; this, as discussed in the text, is an open question. In this case, when P = 13 and θ = √ 2π/4, the maximally tolerated noise is 0.25 (compared to 0.241 when θ = π/4).
From the above it is clear that careful choice of the QW parameters is vital for producing a QKD protocol tolerant of high noise channels. To investigate this further, we simulate the QW for all θ, φ ∈ {kπ/10 | k = 0, 1, · · · , 10}. Furthermore, for each setting, we also consider the use of F = I, F = X, and F = Y , where:
For each setting, we find the optimal choice of time t ≤ 5000 which produces a minimal c. We then take this value and determine the highest disturbance the resulting protocol can withstand. The respective data is summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 : Showing the optimal choice of QW parameters to maximize the noise tolerance (Q max ) of the resulting protocol. For this data, we searched for QWs with at most T max = 5000 steps and with parameters θ, φ ∈ {kπ/10 | k = 0, 1, · · · , 10}.
Note that, for some data points (e.g., when P = 5 and F = I) there is a drop in the maximum tolerated noise. This is a consequence either of setting T max too small, or we need to simulate more QW parameters (as is done in Table 2 ). For example, when we set T max = 50000, for P = 5 and F = I, we get a maximum noise tolerance of 0.236 when t = 40847. Note also, that setting F = Y achieves the best result for this test, Q max = 0.284.
In Table 2 , we carried out the same experiment, however this time searching over QW parameters in the set θ, φ ∈ {kπ/20 | k = 0, 1, · · · , 20}. Again, the best result for this case is Q max = 0.284 and is achieved when considering F = Y . Table 2 : Showing the optimal choice of QW parameters to maximize the noise tolerance (Q max ) of the resulting protocol. For this data, we searched for QWs with at most T max = 5000 steps and with parameters θ, φ ∈ {kπ/20 | k = 0, 1, · · · , 20}.
As mentioned at the beginning of this Section, all the numerical results were obtained by simulating the evolution of the QW on a custom QW simulator that we wrote. However, we also verified the results through an alternative technique, namely by computing the probability amplitudes of the QW using the standard Fourier method (see, e.g. [36, 37] ) of analyzing QWs. The results obtained by both methods agree with each other.
Finally, we note that the protocol's security is not compromized by considering the existence or not of quantum memories. It is sufficient to consider the prepare-and-measure form of the protocol. E needs a quantum memory to perform her attack, as she needs to save her ancillary system throughout the execution of the protocol. In the contrary, the secure key distribution between A and B does not require any quantum memory. Therefore, if E does not have a quantum memory she cannot attack, while if even she has one and attacks, A and B can defend against it and securely share a key at the end. Notice, that even if we consider the entanglement-based version of the protocol, again the security is independent of any quantum memory requirements, as E for her attack needs a more stable quantum memory than A and B need to defend against it and securely distil the key.
Semi-Quantum Key-Distribution Scheme
In this section we will present a SQKD protocol based on QWs. Semi-quantum protocols can be seen as practical instances of QKD, since they involve less quantum hardware, as one of the parties is completely classical. Also, they are interesting from a theoretical point of view, as they can be treated as a measure of the "quantumness" needed for a protocol to surpass the security of its classical counterparts. It is assumed that one of the parties, e.g. A, is fully quantum, i.e., possesses quantum equipment, while the other party, e.g. B, is restricted to classical operations only, and for that reason is usually called the classical party.
Semi-quantum protocols rely on a two-way quantum channel allowing a quantum state to travel from A to B, then back to A. When first introduced by Boyer et al. in [22] , these classical operations involved B either measuring the incoming qubit in the Z = {|0 , |1 } basis, or reflecting the incoming qubit, bouncing it back to A undisturbed. For our purposes, we extend this definition of "classical" operations to operate with higher dimensional systems. As we do not want to restrict ourselves necessarily to qubit encodings (and thus, dimensions that are powers of two), we will say that B, on receipt of an D dimensional quantum state |ψ , may choose to do one of two operations:
1. Measure and Resend: B may subject the D-dimensional quantum state to a measurement in the computational basis spanned by states: {|0 , |1 , · · · , |D − 1 }. He will then prepare a new D-dimensional quantum state in this same computational basis based on the result of his measurement. Namely, if he observes |r for r ∈ {0, 1, · · · , D − 1}, he will send to A the quantum state |r .
2. Reflect: B may ignore the incoming D-dimensional quantum state and reflect it back to A. In this case he learns nothing about its state.
With these restrictions on the part of the classical user defined, we now depict and describe our protocol: Figure 8 : Description of the basic steps of Protocol 3.
Protocol 3. Semi-quantum key-distribution scheme
Inputs for the protocol • |l, s , the initial state of the QW, where l ∈ L = {0, . . . , P − 1} is the initial position of the walker, and s ∈ S = {R, L} gives the initial coin state.
• U walk = (U k ) t ∈ Q, the evolution of the QW, where k ∈ K = {1, 2, . . . , K} is the choice of a single step unitary U k , and t ∈ T = {T 0 , . . . , T max } is the number of steps of the QW. Thus, Q is the set of all possible QWs. Note that Q is publicly known.
Quantum state Generation
• A chooses uniformly at random l ∈ L = {0, 1, · · · , P − 1} and s ∈ S = {R, L}.
She also chooses a random QW operator U walk ∈ Q according to a publicly known distribution (e.g., uniform). She then prepares the following state:
|ψ walk = U walk |l, s .
• A sends this state to B.
Classical operations by B
B chooses either to measure-and-resend the quantum state in the computational basis {|0 , |1 , · · · , |2P − 1 } (note that, in this protocol as well, he measures both the position and coin in order to obtain the key, thus his measurement, and subsequent preparation, is of dimension 2P ); or he will reflect the quantum state back to A.
A's final step
A chooses one of the following two options:
• She measures the returning quantum state in the computational basis and saves the result as κ A .
• She first applies the inverse QW, U −1 walk , and then measures in the computational basis. Note that, in the absence of noise, if B reflects, her measurement outcome should be |l, s .
Disclosure
A discloses her choice of operation and B discloses his choice either to measure and resend or reflect.
Iterations
The above process is repeated N times.
Results
• Every time B measures and resends and A measures in the computational basis, the parties add 1 + log P bits to their final raw key.
• Every time B reflects and A measures after applying the inverse QW, the outcome of her measurement (l m , s m ) should be what she initially used to generate the QW state (i.e., it should be that l = l m and s = s m ). These iterations, together with some randomly chosen iterations of the first type (where B measures and resends), are used for error detection.
• The other iterations are discarded.
Proof of robustness
As with the first protocol we proposed in this paper, the reliance on a two-way quantum channel greatly complicates the security analysis. It was only recently that several SQKD protocols were proven secure [38, 39, 40, 41] . However, the proof techniques developed in those works assumed qubit-level systems. In our case, not only must we contend with a two-way channel, but also with the fact that the quantum states traveling between A and B are of dimensions higher than 2. This leads to significant challenges in any security analysis. Therefore, to analyze the security of this protocol, we will prove that it is robust as defined in [22, 23] . That is, for any attack which E may perform which causes her to gain information on the raw key, this attack must necessarily lead to a disturbance in the channel which can be detected with non-zero probability by A and B. Typically proving robustness is a first-step in the security analysis of semi-quantum cryptographic protocols. Theorem 1. If I ∈ Q (where I is the identity operator on the joint 2P dimensional system) and if, for every (l, s), (l , s ) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , P − 1} × {R, L} there exists a U walk ∈ Q and initial state |l 0 , s 0 (all possibly depending on the choice of (l, s) and (l , s )) such that l, s|U walk |l 0 , s 0 = 0 and l , s |U walk |l 0 , s 0 = 0, then the SQKD protocol based on QWs is robust.
Proof. We will assume, similarly to [42, 43] , that A sends each (in our case 2P -dimensional) quantum state, only after she receives one from B (excepting, of course, the first iteration). In this case, E's most general attack consists of a collection of unitary operators (U
where, on iteration i of the protocol, she applies U
F in the forward channel (as the quantum state travels from A to B) and U (i) R in the reverse channel. These operators act on the 2P -dimensional quantum state and E's private quantum memory. We make no assumptions about how these operators are chosen -for instance, E may choose them "on the fly"; that is, she may choose operator U F . Consider the first iteration i = 1. We assume, without loss of generality, that E's quantum memory is cleared to some pure "zero" state, denoted by |χ , known to her.
In the remainder of this proof, we will treat the position space and the coin space as a single space Σ of dimension 2P .
We may describe the action of U (1) F on basis states as follows
where |e j i are arbitrary states in E's ancillary system. These states are not necessarily normalized nor orthogonal; the unitarity of U (1) F imposes some restrictions on them which we will use later.
With non-zero probability, this iteration may be used for error detection. It is also possible that A chose to use I ∈ Q in this iteration and, thus, she sends the quantum state |σ to B, for σ ∈ Σ. Furthermore, B chooses to measure and resend with non-zero probability. Therefore, to avoid detection, it must be that |e 
R , the attack applied in the reverse channel. We may write its action as follows:
The same argument as before applies: in particular, with non-zero probability A and B will use this iteration to check for errors, and so it must be that |e w i,i ≡ 0 for i = w. Thus
where we defined |f i ≡ |e i i,i for ease of notation. Now, assume that A chooses a QW operator U walk ∈ Q, with U walk = I. Let |σ be the initial state she prepares (σ chosen at random from Σ). In this case, the quantum state she sends to B may be written as:
Assume that U walk is chosen so that at least two of the α i 's are non-zero (such QWs exist by hypothesis). If B reflects, the qubit state arriving at A's lab, after E's attack on both channels, is U
R U
where I E is the identity operator on E's ancilla.
A will subsequently apply the inverse QW operator and measure the resulting state, expecting to find |σ . This is equivalent to her measuring in the QW basis {|ψ 0 , |ψ 1 , · · · , |ψ 2P −1 }, where |ψ i = U walk |i , and expecting to observe |ψ σ . In this QW basis, we clearly have
from which, we may write Equation (12) as:
Let p be the probability that this iteration does not result in an error -i.e., the probability that A measures |ψ σ . From the above equation:
Noticing that ψ σ |i = α * i (since |ψ σ = i α i |i ), and also f i |f i = 1 (due to the unitarity of U (1) R ), we find:
When |f i ≡ |f j = |F , for all i, j, the above quantity attains its maximum of p = 1. In this case, after E's attack, the system described by Equation (12) is i α i |i ⊗ |F = |ψ σ ⊗ |F . Due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality Re( f i |f j ) ≤ 1. If, however, one or more of the Re( f i |f j ) < 1 for any of the (|f i , |f j ) pairs which appear in the expression above (i.e., for those where α i and α j are non-zero), it is obvious that p < 1 and so E would be detected.
Therefore, to avoid detection, it must be that Re( f i |f j ) = 1 for all i, j where α i and α j are non-zero, implying |f i ≡ |f j . Indeed, if we write |f j = x |f i + y |ζ , where f i |ζ = 0, then Re( f i |f j ) = 1 = Re(x). Of course |x| 2 + |y| 2 = 1 (since f j |f j = 1) and so:
This implies both Im(x) = 0 and y = 0. Since Re(x) = 1, we conclude x = 1 and so |f i = |f j . Since A could have chosen any QW in Q, all possible (i, j) pairs are covered (i.e., at least one QW in Q is guaranteed to produce a state where α i and α j are non-zero) and since E does not know which QW was chosen, it must be that |f i ≡ |f j ≡ |F for all i, j.
Thus, after the first iteration, to avoid detection, it must be that the state of E's quantum memory is in the state |F , independently of A's and B's raw key and operations. Thus, E is not able to extract any information during the first iteration. Furthermore, since she is fully aware of the state of her quantum memory in this case (i.e., she knows the state |F ), the above arguments may be repeated inductively for the remaining iterations of the protocol, leading to the conclusion that the protocol is robust.
The above proof of robustness placed certain requirements on the set of QW Q, but can such a set even exist? We show that, at least for all odd P , such a set may be easily constructed.
Lemma 1. If P is odd, then there exists a set of QWs Q which satisfy the requirements of Theorem 1.
Proof. Let (l, s), (l , s ) ∈ {0, 1, · · · , P − 1} × {R, L}. We construct a QW U l,s,l ,s and an initial state |l 0 , s 0 such that l, s|U l,s,l ,s |l 0 , s 0 = 0 and l , s |U l,s,l ,s |l 0 , s 0 = 0.
Since P is odd, there exits a position index q ∈ {0, 1, · · · , P − 1} and a value q 0 ∈ Z such that |q 0 | < P , q − q 0 ≡ l (mod) P , and q + q 0 ≡ l (mod) P . We assume that q 0 ≥ 0; if q 0 < 0 the result is symmetric by simply "flipping" l with l (in which case q 0 becomes non-negative).
The shift operator S for our QW is simply the usual
where all arithmetic, of course, is done modulo P . Our coin operator will simply be the Hadamard coin:
We claim the desired operator is
(Note that the shift operator is applied before the coin in this case to simplify the construction) Now, consider the initial state |q + 1, R . After the first step of the QW (i.e., after applying (I p ⊗ R c ) · S), the QW evolves to the state |q (|R + |L ). It is not difficult to see that, after t additional steps with this QW, but before the final application of I p ⊗ R c on the (t + 1)-th step, the quantum state evolves to:
where |α| = 0, |β| = 0, and |φ is a non-normalized state orthogonal to both |l, R and |l , L . Finally, after the last I p ⊗ R c , the state becomes
with |φ being a state orthogonal to |l, R , |l, L , |l , R , and |l , L , thus yielding the desired state. Taking Q = l,s,l ,s {U l,s,l ,s } ∪ {I} proves the result.
Finally, we should notice that the robustness of this SQKD protocol is independent of the existence or absence of quantum memories. In fact, E's attack requires a stable quantum memory, in which she keeps her ancillary system during the execution of the protocol. On the other hand, A does not need any quantum memory in order to share the key with B at the end, and B is, of course, restricted to classical operations. Therefore, without a quantum memory E cannot even conduct the attack, whereas even if she has access to a quantum memory, she is not able to extract any useful information about the key without being detected by A and B.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper we employed, for the first time to our knowledge, QWs in order to design and analyze new secure QKD protocols.
Perhaps the most important contribution of this work is that it introduces the exciting possibility of using QWs for QKD purposes and may spur new research in both cryptography, and also in QWs. By themselves, QWs exhibit many fascinating properties which, as we've shown here, translate to interesting properties of QKD protocols.
Besides the theoretically interesting intersection of two unique and fascinating fields of quantum information science, there are also potential practical benefits in pursuing this investigation. Some high-dimensional QKD protocols have the ability to withstand a high noise tolerance, as recently proven in [44] and here. Here we are proposing QKD protocols based on high-dimensional states generated by means of QWs. While such systems hold interesting theoretical properties, it could be that, in a future quantum infrastructure, the generation of these QW states would be easier compared to other higher dimensional systems. Indeed, producing such states may not need the high entanglement of many qubits -instead they could be generated through the evolution of a single-qubit walker on, for instance, a multi-node quantum network.
In what follows, we point out some directions of future work. First, it would be interesting to perform a more detailed study on the two verification procedures presented in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 and compare them with respect to various attack strategies. Moreover, one could analyze the relation between the two for concrete cases of Eve's cheating strategies in the presence of noise.
In Section 4, we proved the security of the one-way protocol, but still some improvements could be done. In particular, one could find an analytical solution for the optimal choice of QW parameters or, alternatively, given particular QW parameters, to find an analytical solution for the value of c from Equation (8) . Another interesting question would be to understand the maximally tolerated noise as the dimension of the QW P → ∞ (and also T max → ∞). For instance, in [44] , a high-dimensional QKD protocol was introduced (not using QWs, but simpler states), which could suffer a disturbance up to 50% as the dimension of the state sent by A approached infinity. Can we construct a QW-QKD protocol with similar features? Does our protocol approach this disturbance level for high P ? Moreover, studying and employing other QW models (perhaps the memory-based QWs described and analyzed in, e.g., [45, 46, 47, 48, 33, 49] ) or QWs on different graphs, would be interesting -our key-rate equation would generalize to these cases, the only change would be the value of c; perhaps different QW models, or different graphs, would produce more optimal values, thus increasing the key-rate.
Finally, the SQKD protocol we proposed lacks of a proof of security beyond robustness. As we already mentioned in Section 5, this proof is technically very challenging due to the high-dimensional QW states and the use of a two-way channel. Hence, computing analytically the key-rate is extremely hard and moreover, the numerical simulation is equally challenging, even for low-dimensional walks. Nevertheless, we believe that obtaining the key rate is not impossible, and we expect that this analysis will yield quite high error-tolerance.
A first step towards this direction would be to try to reduce this protocol to a simpler one (for instance, the one in [22] , for which there is a security proof [38] ) and prove that it is at least as secure. This reduction does not seem to be a straightforward task and requires a thorough analysis.
